Pressing personal use in social housing tenancies
Amsterdam subdistrict court terminates the social tenancy of a tenant who owns two homes
A tenant of the housing association Ymere loses his social housing tenancy because he has meanwhile come to own real estate himself. On 27 March 2025 the Amsterdam subdistrict court holds that the tenancy ends on 1 September 2025 on the ground of pressing personal use.
The tenant had rented the property since October 2014 for €495.29 per month. When entering into the tenancy he owned no other home. He subsequently bought three homes — in 2016, 2021 and 2024 — one of which he sold again in July 2024. Two purchased homes remained, which he let out, partly for cash and without a written contract.
Ymere is an approved institution (toegelaten instelling) within the meaning of Section 19 of the Housing Act (Woningwet) and is required to allocate social housing to people who, on account of a low income, cannot provide themselves with housing. In the Amsterdam region the average waiting time for such a home is over thirteen years. Ymere terminated the tenancy on 10 June 2024, relying on pressing personal use (Section 7:274(1)(c) DCC).
Letting to the target group counts as "personal use"
The subdistrict court works through three questions. First: is there "personal use" here? It follows from settled case law that personal use covers not only use by the landlord itself, but also letting to another where doing so serves the landlord's statutory objective. In Sections 7:274a to 7:274f DCC the statute already names specific target groups — people with disabilities, the elderly, young people and students — but that enumeration is not exhaustive. The group "people eligible for a social housing home" can likewise fall under the generic ground of personal use.
In so holding, the subdistrict court recognises a target group that the legislature did not name in so many words. Is that judicial creativity? After all, the legislature codified four specific target groups in Sections 7:274a to 7:274f DCC. Yet the step is defensible: according to settled case law, personal use covers any letting that serves the statutory objective, and allocation to the social target group is a housing association's core task. The novelty lies not in the doctrine but in its application — for the first time, a sitting tenant is displaced on account of owning a home. It is precisely this anchoring in the statutory task that limits the judgment: for a commercial landlord, without a social housing objective, this reasoning does not hold.
In doing so, the subdistrict court draws a sharp distinction. Too high an income (the so-called "scheefhuurder", a tenant earning above the social-housing threshold) does not justify termination: for that the statute provides the income-dependent rent increase. Personal capital does not count either, because assets are not tested when the tenancy is entered into. Ownership of one's own home, however, is relevant, and remains so after the tenancy has commenced. There is therefore no means test, but rather the question whether the tenant still belongs to the target group.
The subdistrict court then assesses the urgency and weighs the interests. The standard derives from settled case law of the Supreme Court (see ECLI:NL:HR:2023:931, with the opinion of the Advocate General ECLI:NL:PHR:2023:232): the landlord must (Section 7:271(4) in conjunction with Section 7:274(1)(c) DCC) make it plausible that it needs the property so urgently that, with all interests weighed in fairness, continuation cannot be required of it, and that the tenant can obtain other suitable housing. The thirteen-year waiting time and Ymere's statutory task give a weighty interest; research shows that around a thousand tenants with a purchased home are still in view. Finally, there must be other suitable housing: the tenant insufficiently substantiated that his own purchased homes would not be suitable. Because the tenant may first have to let his own tenants leave, the subdistrict court sets the end date generously at 1 September 2025.
What does this mean for housing associations and tenants?
For housing associations this judgment opens a route to tackle "scheefwonen" through home ownership without new legislation. The key is the statutory objective: anyone who can demonstrate that the property is needed to fulfil the statutory allocation task can invoke the generic ground of pressing personal use. The substantiation is decisive. In ECLI:NL:GHARL:2023:5824 a reliance on pressing personal use failed precisely because the landlord did not make the urgency plausible. Substantiate the urgency, therefore, with concrete figures on waiting times. The judgment also shows that Ymere systematically reviews its tenant base for home ownership: the research brought around a thousand tenants with a purchased home into view. For tenants with a second home, this means the prospect of scrutiny is real, and that other associations are likely to follow this route.
For tenants, the lesson is that tenancy protection is not an absolute right. Anyone who has suitable housing of their own may lose that protection — even where the social housing home was once rightly allocated. The tenancy nevertheless remains in force under Section 7:272 DCC until the termination has been decided irrevocably; the judgment was therefore not declared provisionally enforceable. This is, moreover, a first-instance judgment of the subdistrict court; an appeal or a ruling of the Supreme Court may yet adjust the line. More on the limits of tenancy protection can be found in Prime Law's real estate and construction practice.
Frequently asked questions
Can a housing association terminate my social housing tenancy if I own a home?
It can in certain circumstances. The Amsterdam subdistrict court held that an association may rely on pressing personal use where the tenant, through home ownership, no longer belongs to the target group and the property is needed for the statutory allocation task. A weighing of interests is required and there must be other suitable housing.
Do my savings or assets also count in such a termination?
No. The subdistrict court draws an explicit distinction: personal capital plays no role, because it was not tested when the tenancy was entered into. Only the ownership of one's own home is relevant. Too high an income does not lead to termination either; for that the income-dependent rent increase exists.
What is pressing personal use in the tenancy of residential accommodation?
Pressing personal use is a ground for termination under Section 7:274(1)(c) DCC. The landlord must make it plausible that it needs the property so urgently for personal use that continuation of the tenancy, with all interests weighed, cannot be required of it. That personal use need not be use by the landlord itself: letting to another can also fall within it where that serves the statutory objective.
Amsterdam District Court 27 March 2025, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:2080 (WR 2025/83; TvPP 2025/51, annotated by R. de Grave).
Cited case law
Supreme Court: ECLI:NL:HR:2023:931
Advocate General: ECLI:NL:PHR:2023:232
Courts of Appeal: ECLI:NL:GHARL:2023:5824
District Courts: ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:2080