Hidden defects after buying a Dutch home: who pays?

Hidden defects after buying a Dutch home

A buyer who discovers a defect after completion is more likely to lose a strong case on procedure than on the defect itself. In March 2026 the Limburg District Court awarded €31,150 without any fault on the seller's part. Whether it comes to that depends on what the buyer does between the first suspicion and the writ: warn, investigate, complain, allow time to repair, and sue in time.

Subsiding extension: seller pays €31,150 without any fault

On 18 March 2026 the Limburg District Court ordered two sellers, jointly and severally, to pay €31,150 in repair costs. The buyer had bought a house built in 1963 with an extension added in the early 1990s. When she instructed a parquet fitter to lay a new floor, he reported that this was impossible because the floor in the extension slopes. An adviser instructed by the buyer established that the foundation departed from the construction drawings attached to the building permit, was structurally unsound, and had therefore begun to subside.

The slope in itself did not yet amount to a defect preventing normal use. What mattered was that the subsidence had not stabilised and was continuing: the adviser's conclusion that further subsidence would cause the roof and facade connections to fail and give rise to damp problems went unchallenged. That made it a defect obstructing normal use.

The seller submitted that he had had cracks made good earlier and had been told by the builders that cracking is normal where new construction abuts old. It was not established that he knew of the subsidence. The same held for the buyer: the seller failed to explain why she, after two short viewings, should have been aware of subsidence he had not noticed in years of living there. There was therefore no reason for further investigation. The age clause failed because it covers only defects connected with the age of the property, whereas this was a construction defect present from the outset which did not meet the standards applicable at the time either.

He paid all the same. The warranty in article 6.3 of the purchase agreement operates irrespective of fault. It did, however, cap the exposure: liability for the repair costs only, here €31,150 to stabilise the extension, and not for the consequential cost of correcting the slope or levelling the floor. The court assessed the loss itself there and then, on the report of the expert it had appointed, and also ordered the seller to pay the attachment costs and the costs of the proceedings. That the seller pays even though he knew nothing follows from the scheme of the purchase deed.

When is a defect the seller's responsibility?

The starting point of the standard Dutch purchase deed runs counter to what buyers expect. Article 6.1 transfers the property as it stands, with all defects visible and invisible, and the buyer accepts that condition, so in principle he carries the risk of whatever surfaces later. Article 6.3 makes one exception: the seller warrants that on transfer the property has the characteristics required for normal use as a dwelling. The question is therefore never whether something is wrong with the house, but whether the defect obstructs normal use.

Normal use is filled in according to ordinary usage: the property must be safe to live in, reasonably durable, and its enjoyment not materially impaired. Not every imperfection meets that threshold. The age of the property also colours what a buyer may expect, because an old house comes with a degree of deferred maintenance. The asbestos cases work the same test out in more detail.

Within that exception, allocation runs along knowledge and knowability. Defects that obstruct normal use but were known or knowable to the buyer when the contract was concluded are for his account. Knowable also covers defects he would have found on the investigation reasonably required of him, and that duty arises only where there is reason to doubt what was represented about the property. Where the defect is unknown on both sides, article 6.3 operates as a warranty, as in the Limburg case: the repair costs only, with a deduction for betterment and no consequential loss.

A suspicion calls for action, not yet for a complaint

Once there is a suspicion, something starts running. Section 7:23 DCC imposes two obligations on the buyer which are often collapsed into one. In 2007 the Supreme Court expressly separated them. First, the buyer must carry out the investigation that may reasonably be expected of him in the circumstances. Second, he must notify the seller within a reasonable time after discovering the defect, or after he should have discovered it on such an investigation. The length of the investigation period depends on the circumstances, including the nature and observability of the defect, the way in which it comes to light, and the buyer's own expertise.

For the private buyer of a home that separation proved favourable. A buyer who discovers defects which may mean the house does not conform to the agreement may instruct an expert and may in principle await the outcome before approaching the seller. That holds even where outward signs had shown him something was wrong, but he could not state the nature, seriousness and cause with precision without an expert. His own lack of expertise may earn him a longer period: any other view would compel him to complain about every possible defect, which serves the seller no better.

That delay comes with two conditions. The buyer may in principle await the outcome without informing the seller of the investigation, but as soon as it is to be expected, at the outset or in the course of it, that the investigation will take longer, he must notify the seller without delay of that investigation and its expected duration. And the investigation itself must be pursued with the diligence that may reasonably be required of him.

Two years of investigation can be timely, inaction is not

The diligence required is not a fixed notion. In 2011 the Supreme Court added what else it depends on: the complexity of the investigation, and the cooperation of third parties, which is not always at the buyer's risk. Where it can be established simply whether a suspected defect exists, the investigation may not take long; where lengthy or costly investigation is needed, the buyer must be allowed the time. The more strongly the buyer was entitled to trust that the property was sound, for instance because of reassuring statements by the seller, the less readily can diligent investigation be expected of him.

How far that can stretch is shown by a Breda case. In late 2016 the buyer came to suspect that the second-floor construction was unsound and in August 2017 he informed the seller by telephone of that suspicion and of the investigation he intended to commission. The investigation then ran on: a first survey in September 2017, structural calculations, a second in November 2018, and the final report only on 9 May 2019, after which he wrote to the sellers in June and July 2019. Almost two years, and still in time. The sellers had substantiated no prejudice, had obtained a counter-survey unimpeded, and the buyer had postponed repairs pending the ruling. The court awarded €65,027.20 in damages, €1,750 for temporary accommodation and €6,374.09 in expert costs.

The reverse appears from a Haarlem case about an indoor swimming pool. That buyer reported general leakage problems in December 2021 and announced that he would have the matter looked into professionally. He then went silent for a year, had the investigation carried out only in November 2022, and complained about the pool leak in December 2022. In the meantime he had removed the hedges and trees around the house, excavated his own harbour, had steel sheet piling driven, and demolished some 30 m² of terrace floor. It could no longer be ruled out that those works had contributed to the leak, and he had taken no photographs of the earlier situation either. The sellers' evidential position was seriously impaired, which amounted to substantial prejudice. Nothing survived of the €51,797.33 claimed and the buyer paid €3,907 in costs. That he had not wanted to trouble the sellers did not help him.

How long does a buyer have to complain?

The statute names no number of days or weeks. Section 7:23(1) DCC requires the buyer to complain within a reasonable time after he discovered the defect or ought to have discovered it. Whether he did is answered by weighing all the interests involved and all the relevant circumstances, among them whether the lapse of time causes the seller prejudice. No fixed period may be applied, not even as a starting point. That balancing cuts both ways, and the outcomes diverge widely.

Just over a year was too late at both instances. The buyer of a 300-year-old converted farmhouse costing €547,500 was told at a viewing on 9 April 2017, by a neighbour specialising in old properties, that there was asbestos beneath the entire tiled roof. The property was transferred on 4 December 2017; he held the sellers liable for the removal costs only on 21 June 2018. The district court and the court of appeal ran the period from 9 April 2017 and held the notification untimely. His conversion plans gave him all the more reason to inform the seller earlier. For the court of appeal that was an additional ground: the buyer failed primarily on his duty of investigation, having commissioned no asbestos survey despite ample pointers, and the statement fell within his three-day cooling-off period. The claim to vary the effects of the agreement for mistake fell with it, because it rested on the same facts.

Two years, on the other hand, was timely, and that is where the lesson lies. A buyer in Maastricht saw discolouration on the storage room wall in November 2018. The seller explained that it had appeared when he once drained the jacuzzi. That explanation was, in the court's view, so concrete and plausible that the buyer was entitled to rely on it and had no further duty of investigation at that point, so the notification period did not begin in November 2018. She complained on 5 October 2020, almost two years later, and the plea on the duty to notify came to nothing. The seller had pleaded no alternative starting date, and had besides confined himself to observing that eighteen months had passed, without stating what relevant prejudice that had caused him. Nor did his defence that she ought to have complained within two months succeed: that period in Section 7:23(1) DCC applies only to a consumer sale, and a consumer sale requires movable property. She was awarded €12,000.

The clock runs per defect, the seller proves prejudice

The clock does not always start where a buyer expects it to. To begin with, the period runs per defect, not per property. In a second Limburg case, from 2021, the complaint about the roof was timely. A dry spell followed the transfer, so the damage manifested itself only later and the buyer then made contact at once. The loose tiles in the walk-in shower were raised only in the writ of summons of 10 December 2019 and were out of time. Complaining in time gained that buyer nothing in the end: his roof claim still foundered on the age clause and on his duty of investigation.

And the duty of investigation has a limit. The second sentence of Section 7:23(1) DCC covers two situations. The property turns out to lack a characteristic which the seller stated it possessed, or the deviation concerns facts he knew or ought to have known but did not disclose. In both, notification must be given within a reasonable time of discovery. The element "ought to have discovered" thus drops away: where the seller has made incorrect statements or has breached his duty of disclosure lies the limit of the buyer's duty of investigation.

The burden of proof makes the practical difference. Reliance on the duty to notify is a defence in discharge. The buyer states and if necessary proves that and when he complained. It is then for the seller to substantiate when the period began and that the lapse of time was too long. If the buyer argues that the seller suffered no prejudice, the burden of pleading and proving that prejudice rests on the seller. In Breda the defence came unstuck on precisely that; in Maastricht it was the second reason.

Allow time to repair before calling in your own builder

Notifying and holding liable are two different acts, and that distinction costs buyers more cases than the duty to notify does. Damages for breach require the seller to be in default. Default arises where the seller is given notice of default in a written demand allowing him a reasonable period for performance, and that period passes unused (Section 6:82 DCC). Without default there are no damages, even where the defect and the non-conformity are established, unless performance has become permanently impossible (Section 6:74(2) DCC).

An Amsterdam case about a leaking bathroom shows how sharply that plays out. The subdistrict court found the property non-conforming and the sellers in breach, and then dismissed everything. The WhatsApp messages by which the buyers kept the sellers informed were no notice of default: they set no period for repair and said nothing about liability. Nor was there default by operation of law, the assertion that the sellers had denied liability being insufficiently substantiated. What was decisive was the sellers' own case, insufficiently rebutted. Given the chance, they would have had the builder who installed the bathroom carry out the repair at his own cost, which would probably have been far cheaper.

The buyers could not shower for four months and had a builder available. That did not make the situation so urgent that a written period could be skipped. Even in an emergency, every effort must be made to enable the other party to repair, by telephone if need be. Nothing survived of the €11,537.16 claimed, and because partial rescission also requires default, that claim lapsed as well.

Waiting five days made the difference elsewhere. In a Haarlem case the subdistrict court had already held in an interim judgment that the roof was non-conforming. The buyers had the roof repaired on 23 September 2022 and held the sellers liable on 26 September, three days later, because the sellers were on holiday until 26 September. They knew that: the court saw no reason why they could not have waited the five days between the inspection on 21 September and the sellers' return. The plea of acute necessity failed partly because the roof inspection had been carried out with solar panels in mind rather than in response to a leak. The repair invoice of €7,096.59 stayed with the buyers, and the loss was insufficiently substantiated besides: no proof of payment, not the original invoice, and a chronology of leak, repair and expert findings that raised more questions than it answered.

Repairing also costs evidence. In October 2025 a subdistrict court in Haarlem dismissed the claim of buyers of a holiday home. Their own choice to have the defects repaired, without first having the earlier situation assessed and recorded by an independent expert, put them at a disadvantage. A pile of receipts and invoices did not suffice: for each defect it must be clear how the repair was carried out and what it cost, with a deduction for betterment because the repair leaves the property in better condition.

The claim becomes time-barred two years after notification

The notification that safeguards the buyer's rights sets a second clock running at the same time. Section 7:23(2) DCC provides that claims and defences based on facts which would justify the assertion that the property delivered does not conform to the agreement are time-barred two years after that notification. A buyer who complains and then negotiates for years without interrupting the limitation period is left empty-handed, however strong the defect.

Choosing a different legal basis does not help. In 2017 the Supreme Court held that the two-year period also applies to a claim for fraud founded on facts which would justify the assertion that what was delivered does not conform to the agreement. Only in so far as a fraud claim is supported by facts which independently, apart from the facts capable of sustaining a non-conformity claim, constitute fraud does the period remain inapplicable. The same line has long applied to claims in tort. And allowing the period in the first subsection to pass unused also bars reliance on mistake based on the same facts, and that is how the asbestos case about the converted farmhouse ended as well. One opening remains: the third subsection suspends the period for as long as the buyer cannot exercise his rights as a result of the seller's intent.

What should a buyer who discovers a defect do?

Start with a notification to the seller, even where the nature and extent of the defect are still unknown. Report the suspicion, report that an investigation will follow, and report how long it is likely to take. The Breda buyer did so by telephone, gained almost two years of investigation room and won his case; do it in writing, because the notification has to be provable later. Then carry the investigation out promptly: the Haarlem swimming pool buyer had informed the seller of leaks and announced an investigation, and lost his claim all the same, because he left the announced investigation for a year and had the grounds around the house rebuilt in the meantime.

Then put things on record: photograph and document before anyone starts work. In two of the cases discussed, the claim or the quantification of loss did not hold up for want of any record of the earlier situation. Preferably have the condition assessed by an independent expert, and keep the original invoices and proof of payment; a collection of receipts without allocation per defect is not enough, and allow for a possible deduction for betterment.

Then give the seller a reasonable period for repair in writing, before your own builder arrives. That may be in the same letter as the complaint. Only genuine urgency can shorten that period, and even then an attempt to reach the seller belongs with it. A buyer who repairs first and holds the seller liable afterwards is left with an established defect and a claim that fails. Then diarise the limitation period: two years from the letter of complaint, interruptible under the ordinary rules.

For a seller it works in mirror image. Responding to a complaint and offering to arrange the repair is the strongest defence available, because it limits the loss and keeps the evidential position intact. Where a complaint comes late, reliance on the duty to notify stands a chance only if the prejudice is made concrete: which works made the cause untraceable, which witness is no longer available, which cheaper repair was missed. Observing that eighteen months have passed will not do. And an age clause protects a seller who knew nothing less than he thinks: it reaches no further than the age itself, and a construction fault present from the outset falls outside it. Where the defect does relate to the age and the buyer fails to challenge that properly, the clause does its work.

Frequently asked questions

What counts as a hidden defect in a house?

The term appears nowhere in the statute. What matters is whether the defect materially affects safe living or the enjoyment of the home, and whether the buyer knew of it, or could have known of it, when the contract was concluded. Deferred maintenance that fits the age of the house falls outside it, and so does a defect the buyer could have seen.

May a buyer have the defect repaired straight away?

Better not. Damages require the seller to be in default, and that calls for a written demand allowing a reasonable period for repair. In the decisions analysed, buyers with an established defect were left without compensation because they repaired first. Only genuine urgency justifies a shorter period, and even then a telephone attempt belongs with it.

Do mistake and fraud also lapse after two years?

Usually yes. The two-year period in Section 7:23(2) DCC covers claims in tort and for fraud which in substance rest on the same defect, and a plea of mistake already runs aground on the notification period in the first subsection. Only facts amounting to fraud independently fall outside it. Deliberate concealment by the seller also suspends the period while it keeps the buyer from enforcing his rights.

Cited case law

Supreme Court: ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ7617 (29 June 2007, Pouw/Visser: investigation and notification periods of the private buyer, no fixed period on a non-consumer sale, expert investigation may in principle be awaited, with notification without delay once a longer duration is to be expected); ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP8991 (25 March 2011, Ploum/Smeets II: diligence depends on complexity and on third-party cooperation, and prejudice to the seller is to an important degree also decisive); ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2902 (17 November 2017, the two-year period applies to fraud as well, unless the facts constitute fraud independently).

Courts of appeal: ECLI:NL:GHARL:2021:7747 (10 August 2021, just over a year between knowledge and notification is too late, and the mistake claim falls with it).

District courts: ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2026:2787 (Roermond, 18 March 2026, the article 6.3 warranty binds a seller without fault, repair costs only); ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2025:12285 (Haarlem, 22 October 2025, repairing without recording the earlier situation tells against the buyer evidentially); ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2024:7764 (Haarlem, 31 July 2024, the five days until the seller's return could have been awaited); ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2024:6639 (Haarlem, 3 July 2024, leaving an announced investigation for a year while carrying out building works causes prejudice); ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2024:2497 (Amsterdam, 12 April 2024, non-conformity established, yet no damages absent a notice of default); ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2023:5699 (Maastricht, 20 September 2023, a reassuring explanation by the seller postpones the notification period, two-month defence rejected); ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2021:5968 (Roermond, 28 July 2021, the notification period runs per defect); ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2021:1948 (Breda, 21 April 2021, almost two years of investigation is timely where the suspicion was reported and the seller substantiates no prejudice); ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2020:7670 (Zutphen, 17 April 2020, first instance in the farmhouse case, limit of the duty of investigation where statements are incorrect, as a standard).

Juriaan de Vries is an attorney at Prime Law, specialising in corporate and commercial litigation. See the disclaimer.

Hidden defects after buying a Dutch home: from suspicion to summons