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Lawyer's fee clause: when is an hourly rate insufficient?

24 March 2026Juriaan de Vries

Lawyer's invoice without a cost estimate: what the courts assess

A woman funding her legal assistance through crowdfunding agrees an hourly rate of €200 with a new law firm. She receives no cost estimate. The firm eventually claims €64,579 including VAT. On 18 March 2026, Amsterdam District Court annuls the fee clause as unfair. Part of the claim survives only for a supplementary engagement for which a separate cost estimate had been provided.

The absence of an estimate does not automatically produce that outcome. The Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal and The Hague Court of Appeal upheld other non-transparent fee clauses. Since the Court of Justice judgment of 12 January 2023, transparency and unfairness require separate assessment. Courts also differ on compensation for work already performed after annulment.

The opinion of Advocate General Drijber of 16 October 2026 in Kienhuishoving provides an overview of this area. He distinguishes five questions: is the provision a core term, is it transparent, is it unfair if transparency is lacking, can the contract survive without it and what consequences follow? That sequence guides the discussion below. The statutory information duties and the duty of care during performance stand alongside it. Drijber advises dismissal of the cassation appeal; his opinion is advice, not a judgment (sections 4.8 and 5).

Must a lawyer give a cost estimate in advance?

As a rule, yes, without having to predict an exact final amount. According to The Hague Court of Appeal, Rule 17 of the Rules of Conduct generally requires a reasonable cost estimate. For transparency of an hourly fee term, the Court of Justice judgment of 12 January 2023 supplies the European framework: an hourly rate without further specification is insufficient.

The Court accepts that proceedings can be unpredictable. Before the engagement, the consumer must nevertheless receive guidance allowing an approximate estimate of the total cost. Examples include foreseeable or minimum hours, or an undertaking to send invoices or time statements at reasonable intervals (paragraph 44). Whether the information suffices depends on the circumstances.

That does not establish unfairness. Directive 93/13 requires a separate assessment. A reduction for breached information duties or an award of damages also requires its own legal basis.

1. Which fee terms can the court assess?

The term setting the price for legal services is a core term. In so far as it is plain and intelligible, it is exempt from substantive unfairness assessment. If transparency is lacking, it may be assessed under Section 6:231 DCC and following and annulled for unfairness. This concerns the remuneration clause; other terms require their own assessment.

A genuinely individually negotiated term falls outside Directive 93/13. The Supreme Court judgment of 5 December 2025 upheld the finding that a rate arrangement devised specifically for the engagement, with a discount scheme, fell outside its scope (paras 3.2-3.5). Discussing and accepting a standard rate is insufficient: the consumer must have been able genuinely to influence its content (Amsterdam District Court 2026, paras 4.4-4.7).

The Dutch general-terms regime can reach further. A negotiated term may still fall within Division 6.5.3 DCC if drafted for multiple contracts and not covered by the exception for clear and intelligible core terms. Offering variations on standard terms is no safe harbour (Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26 470, no. 5). A term genuinely formulated for a single contract falls outside that regime.

The applicable information duties remain. In the same case, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of sufficient information about price calculation where the total could not be calculated in advance (para. 3.6). That does not also determine transparency under Directive 93/13. Advocate General Wissink warns against equating these tests (opinion accompanying the judgment, section 2.31).

2. When is the fee clause transparent?

In the decisions analysed, a bare hourly rate is not transparent. Periodic time statements after the event do not cure that either. In the ITA case (Amsterdam District Court 2026) the lawyer sent time statements almost every month, and even so the court held that this was not enough: the duty to inform cannot be discharged by sending statements afterwards of work already done, and the client had no reference point at all against which to measure those statements. Nor is it only about large invoices. For assistance at a police interview in a criminal case, with an advance invoice of €726, an engagement letter stating only the hourly rate and the advance was not plain and intelligible either (The Hague District Court 2026).

Where the courts of appeal diverge is on what suffices in addition, and above all on monthly invoicing agreed in advance. On 26 November 2024 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled in a case concerning a lawyer who had assisted a client in a divorce. The hourly rate of €165 had been communicated in advance, the engagement letter stated that invoices would be rendered monthly, and the client had never complained. Yet the court held that, even with that arrangement, the clause was not transparent: the lawyer should have indicated in advance whether this was a €5,000, a €10,000 or a €50,000 case (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2024, paras 2.4, 2.6 and 2.7).

The Hague Court of Appeal did consider such an arrangement sufficient on 12 May 2026. There the engagement letter contained, alongside the hourly rate of €150, an undertaking to render interim invoices monthly, precisely the second example the Court of Justice gives. The court took into account that the number of hours required depended heavily on the attitude of the opposing party, so that a forecast beforehand would add little to monthly invoicing. That the lawyer then did not keep to the arrangement and invoiced only after more than two years did not detract from transparency (The Hague Court of Appeal May 2026, para. 6.40).

Both courts of appeal assess transparency by what was agreed when the contract was concluded, not by how invoicing was done later or whether the term was actually performed (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2024, para. 2.7; The Hague Court of Appeal May 2026, para. 6.40, referring to Supreme Court 21 April 2017). On what then suffices, they diverge. The Hague accepts monthly invoicing recorded in advance as sufficient (likewise Almelo subdistrict court 2026, para. 3.5). Amsterdam found that same arrangement insufficient (likewise Haarlem subdistrict court March 2026, para. 4.4). An advance indication of scale helps avoid this transparency dispute.

The difference remained visible in September 2026. Amsterdam District Court found monthly bills without a cost indication insufficient where amounts varied sharply and financial difficulties were known (paras 4.10-4.14). By contrast, Overijssel District Court on 28 July 2026 accepted a transparent fee clause on the evidence of prior information, interim bills and discussions about continuing the work. It awarded €15,145.64 (paras 3.8-3.10).

The consumer must receive sufficient information in advance to estimate the costs approximately. That need not be a precise budget. A quotation itemised by phase is a sound price indication (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2023). An advance of €50,000 excluding VAT alongside the hourly rates of tax advisers in a complex tax dispute sufficed as an indication of the costs to be expected: the consumer knew she was embarking on a course involving substantial costs (Amsterdam Court of Appeal January 2025). For construction work, a target price within the meaning of Section 7:752 DCC or a broad indication of scale may provide such guidance.

The hours do remain open to review, however. In the case with the €50,000 advance, the consumer disputed the time statement date by date, the court estimated the reasonable hours itself, and of the €60,500 paid, €30,385.25 had to be repaid (Amsterdam Court of Appeal January 2025, paras 4.6.4-4.6.7).

Alongside the information required before the engagement, information and care duties also apply during performance. In a case in which a lawyer carried on working without informing the client about the financial consequences of the work still to be done, breach of that continuing duty to inform led to a 20 per cent reduction (Central Netherlands District Court January 2026).

3. When is the term also unfair?

A transparency defect is a factor in unfairness. The test is whether the term, contrary to good faith, causes a significant imbalance to the consumer’s detriment. This involves comparison with the national law applicable without the term (Supreme Court 21 April 2017, paras 3.5.4-3.5.6). It also matters whether the provider could reasonably have expected the consumer to accept the term in fair negotiations.

The Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal applied this in Kienhuishoving. Without a price arrangement, Section 7:405(2) DCC requires the customary fee or, failing that, a reasonable fee. Rates of €280 and €130 were neither unreasonable nor unusual. The statutory rule likewise gives no advance certainty about the total cost. The court therefore found no relevant deterioration in the consumer’s legal position. Advocate General Drijber endorses that separate unfairness assessment while discussing counterarguments (sections 4.52-4.62). The comparison also includes statutory information and care duties: an hourly rate does not displace Sections 7:401 and 7:403 DCC. A valid fee clause and a breach during performance can therefore coexist (sections 4.54-4.55).

In July 2026, The Hague Court of Appeal took a similar approach. Despite no estimate or undertaking to provide time statements, the rate was not unreasonable and there had been no misleading suggestions. The court awarded the full €1,763.24 invoice. In its view, a missing estimate alone does not justify annulment (paras 5.6-5.13).

The assessment may take account of factors including:

  • The client’s known financial position.
  • Suggestions that an advance will suffice or a third party will pay.
  • Whether the rate is customary and its amount.
  • The advance information about work and costs.
  • A cost indication that is substantially exceeded.

These are not automatic grounds for annulment. Known financial vulnerability weighed heavily in the Amsterdam ITA case. A non-lawyer provider in Haarlem mentioned five to ten hours but billed €24,396.78, after creating the impression that the employer would pay. A misleading suggestion about an advance, known vulnerability in settlement negotiations and failure to estimate interview-assistance costs contributed to unfairness in other cases.

Timing matters. In an employment dispute, the estimate reached the insurer, copying the client, only after work began. The lawyer also failed adequately to warn about exceeding €8,000 of insurance cover. On 23 September 2026, The Hague District Court annulled the clause and dismissed the claim for further fees (para. 4.5 and paras 4.8-4.11). A later estimate therefore does not automatically cure information missing when the engagement began.

4. Can the contract survive without the term?

After an unfair fee clause is annulled, several courts hold that the contract cannot survive without that price term (’s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2025, para. 6.23). That does not mean every missing fee agreement makes a contract invalid. The question is what remains after this particular unfair term is removed.

5. What compensation may remain after annulment?

Amsterdam District Court 2026 refused substitution of a reasonable fee under Section 7:405 DCC (para. 4.20), as did the ’s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2025 (para. 6.24). The Court of Justice prohibits replacing the unfair term with remuneration assessed by the court itself. Where removal of the term invalidates the whole contract and exceptionally exposes the consumer to particularly unfavourable consequences, substitution by an applicable supplementary national provision may be available under specified conditions (paragraphs 63-68). Nor may mandatory law simply replace the unfair term (Supreme Court 10 February 2023, Childcare).

The lower courts differ on further compensation. On 16 June 2026, the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal dismissed a €44,925.60 claim. It had not been sufficiently clear at the outset that the client owed an hourly fee at all. The court refused substitute reasonable remuneration. Claims based on payment without legal basis and unjust enrichment also failed; a further limitation was that the earlier rejection of those grounds had not been challenged by a discernible appeal ground (paras 3.30-3.32). Earlier, the same court allowed recovery from a personal injury client of the amount he had expected to pay: €6,352.25 of €18,332.55 (Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal 2024, para. 3.29).

Other courts allow compensation on a non-contractual basis. In January 2026, the Haarlem subdistrict court awarded 50 per cent on the basis of payment without legal basis (paras 2.9-2.12). It drew on the Supreme Court judgment of 4 October 2024, which concerned a different sanction: annulment for a defective order button. That judgment does not directly determine compensation following an unfair lawyer’s fee clause.

On 30 September 2026, Amsterdam District Court rejected reasonable remuneration but allowed compensation for the value of services supplied without legal basis. It reduced that compensation by 40 per cent, by analogy with the sanctions model for information duties (paras 4.24-4.31). This was that court’s approach, not a generally applicable reduction for unfair terms. After accounting for payments and separate invoice corrections, the firm had to repay €5,456.84 (paras 4.63-4.66).

A substitute payment is therefore uncertain. Advocate General Drijber also describes recourse to Section 7:405(2) DCC following an unfair fee clause as disputed and expressly distinguishes the sanctions model from the consequences of unfairness (opinion of 16 October 2026, section 4.43). The grounds pleaded, the facts substantiated and the objections maintained on appeal may all matter.

Where the fee clause is not unfair but merely non-transparent, the contract stands. A reduction may then still follow from the sanctions model, if the court regards the absence of an estimate as a breach of the duty to inform, but that is not automatic.

Which information duties apply alongside this?

How the engagement is concluded determines the statutory information duties. An engagement at the office is generally governed by Section 6:230l DCC: among other things, the characteristics of the service, the total price or its calculation where that price cannot be determined in advance, and termination conditions where applicable.

Distance engagements are governed by Sections 6:230m and 6:230v DCC, with additional information and confirmation requirements. For off-premises engagements, Section 6:230m and the formal requirements of Section 6:230t DCC apply. Contact by telephone or email alone does not make an engagement a distance contract.

A distance contract requires an organised distance service-provision scheme (Section 6:230g(1)(e) DCC). According to the legislative history, distance communication must be used systematically; a website providing information alone is insufficient (Parliamentary Papers II 2012/13, 33 520, no. 3, part (e); II 1999/2000, 26 861, no. 3, p. 13).

Where the engagement was negotiated in person, subsequent acceptance by email does not turn it into a distance contract (Overijssel District Court 2024). Conversely, no order button is required: a website encouraging distance contact can, together with the wider contracting process, constitute an organised scheme (Central Netherlands District Court February 2026). The regimes are discussed further in the article on pre-contractual information duties for service providers.

Price reductions of 10 to 60 per cent

Separately from unfairness, a sufficiently serious breach of essential information duties can reduce the payment obligation. The basis is partial annulment, rather than a statutory fixed discount (Supreme Court 12 November 2021, paras 3.1.15 and 3.1.19).

The national Sanctions Model for Essential Information Duties, amended on 6 February 2025, distinguishes five categories:

  • One to three breaches, compliant order button: 20 per cent reduction.
  • No breaches, non-compliant order button: 33.33 per cent.
  • One or two breaches and a non-compliant order button: 40 per cent.
  • Four or more breaches, compliant order button: 40 per cent.
  • Three or more breaches and a non-compliant order button: 60 per cent.

The order-button rule concerns electronically concluded distance contracts to which that requirement applies. It does not automatically arise for an office engagement or email correspondence without an electronic ordering process. Other information duties may still apply. The model is not binding: any departure requires reasons addressing effectiveness, proportionality and deterrence (Supreme Court 10 June 2022, para. 3.4).

The outcomes illustrate that flexibility. Limited breaches or an unusual relationship led to 10 per cent (Amsterdam Court of Appeal May 2025; North Holland District Court June 2025). Legal-fee cases attracted 20 per cent (Central Netherlands District Court; North Holland District Court). Under the old model, one case resulted in 25 per cent (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2024); others resulted in 40 per cent (Amsterdam Court of Appeal July 2025) and, with particular financial vulnerability, 60 per cent (Gelderland District Court May 2025). These percentages do not predict the outcome of a new case.

Damages as a third route

A lawyer may also breach the duty of care, regardless of the fee term’s fairness. Section 7:401 DCC requires the care of a competent service provider; Section 7:403 DCC requires interim information. Rule 17 informs those obligations. Civil damages additionally require loss and causation.

In Kienhuishoving, the client failed to substantiate sufficiently that better information would have changed his actions during the first period. For the period after October 2019, the court reached a different conclusion: timely cost information would have given a real chance of stopping the appeal sooner. It valued that lost chance at €20,000, based on a 50 per cent chance of avoiding €40,000 in costs. As the firm had already reduced its bills from over €104,000 to €75,000, the court declined a further reduction of its own motion for breached information duties; after set-off, €55,000 remained (Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal 2025, paras 6.22-6.24).

In May 2026, The Hague Court of Appeal identified a similar possible breach in failing to bill monthly, but no damages claim based on that failure had been made (para. 6.45). A lost-chance valuation may therefore be appropriate, but is not a general valuation rule. The issue is the financial effect of the particular breach, rather than a percentage from the sanctions model.

A disciplinary finding does not decide the civil invoice dispute. On 8 June 2026 the Disciplinary Court of Appeal held that a broad estimate of hours should have been given, but dismissed the complaint after considering, among other things, continuing communication and credits applied to invoices (paras 7.5-7.6).

What does this mean for the engagement letter?

The engagement letter must give the client sufficient guidance about costs. Where an overall estimate is not feasible, it can identify which work can be estimated, what uncertainties remain and when time and costs will next be discussed.

An estimate is not always a fixed ceiling. In ITA, the court considered a higher charge justified for separately estimated preliminary relief proceedings because the work had been made harder and further negotiations were needed (Amsterdam District Court 2026, para. 4.25.3). That does not remove the duty to warn about a foreseeable substantial overrun.

It must also be clear who pays if an employer or insurer does not pay or pays only part. An advance should not be presented as a cost ceiling unless that has been agreed. Information about rising costs remains necessary during the engagement. The obligation to account for the bill afterwards, including under a fixed fee, is discussed in the article on the lawyer’s invoice.

A voluntary reduction may affect the outcome, as in Kienhuishoving (para. 6.24). It does not generally cure a defective clause. For a disputed bill, the five questions, the applicable information duties and any damages claim remain separate issues.

Frequently asked questions

When is a service provider's fee clause transparent?

A fee clause is transparent if the consumer can assess the financial consequences in advance. An hourly rate alone is insufficient. In the cases discussed, a quotation by phase, a broad cost estimate, a substantial advance as a cost indication or a target price could provide sufficient clarity. The courts of appeal differ on whether monthly invoicing agreed in advance is enough.

What if the lawyer substantially exceeds the cost estimate?

The lawyer must warn in good time when a substantial overrun is foreseen. To recover damages, the client must establish what loss resulted from the missing warning. In Kienhuishoving, the lost chance to stop sooner was valued at €20,000. An overrun does not automatically make the whole invoice repayable.

Can a lawyer still claim anything after the fee clause has been annulled?

That is uncertain. Some courts refuse substitute compensation; others allow limited compensation for services supplied without legal basis. The outcomes discussed, including 50 per cent recovery and a 40 per cent reduction, do not establish a fixed rule. A separate engagement with sufficient cost information may still create a payment obligation.

Cited case law

Court of Justice of the European Union

Supreme Court of the Netherlands

Opinions of the Advocates General

Courts of appeal

District courts

Disciplinary decisions

See also