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Suretyship for legal fees annulled: Rule 19 of the Rules of Conduct and a director-shareholder's personal security

7 April 2026Juriaan de Vries

Suretyship and personal security in legal practice

In five court of appeal judgments, security that lawyers had required for their invoices was annulled, in three cases a suretyship or guarantee from a director-shareholder. The standard behind this has been set out in Rule 19 of the Rules of Conduct for the Legal Profession since 2018, and the disciplinary tribunals enforce it. Even after a claim for annulment is time-barred, that ground for annulment may still be invoked as a defence against a claim under the security.

Suretyship signed before a hearing: claim against director-shareholder dismissed

In May 2012, just before a hearing in a case involving his company, the director and shareholder of Product Source B.V. signed a document handed to him by his lawyer. By doing so he stood surety and became jointly and severally liable for all of the firm's invoices to the company. The company went bankrupt, €8,203.66 remained unpaid and the subdistrict court ordered the director to pay as surety. The court of appeal set that judgment aside and dismissed the claim ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2016, paras 4.1 and 4.10).

What was said at the signing remained in dispute. According to the director, a note was pushed under his nose with the message that the lawyer could not otherwise continue with the case. According to the lawyer, there had been no threat and he had explained the consequences. The court did not need to resolve that. Even on the lawyer's account, the suretyship was security other than money, given without a special case and without consultation with the Dean. The lawyer knew of the company's financial distress and had the director sign at a tense moment, and that amounted to abuse of circumstances ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2016, paras 4.4-4.7).

The court was not alone in this. In 2012 the same court had annulled joint and several liability that a law firm had required of a director in exchange for releasing his company's case file. By his undisputed account, the director was suffering from burn-out and the company was on the verge of bankruptcy ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2012, paras 11.3 and 11.4.6). In 2014 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal upheld the annulment of a personal guarantee that a lawyer had obtained after a series of emails shortly before a hearing. "You don't have much time left", one of those emails read (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2014, paras 2.4 and 3.9).

Rule 19: the same standard under a new number

The judgments of 2012, 2014 and 2016 apply Rule 28(1) of the Rules of Conduct for the Legal Profession 1992. Those rules were replaced in February 2018 by the Rules of Conduct for the Legal Profession 2018, and the standard is now in Rule 19: "A lawyer is not permitted to accept security for payment of his invoice other than an advance in money, except in special cases and then only after consultation with the Dean." Apart from one word (toegestaan, permitted, replacing geoorloofd), this is the old text. Rule 19(2) applies the same to settling an invoice other than in money. Anyone looking up Rule 28 today finds a different rule: it deals with taking over clients and handing over the file to the successor lawyer.

The disciplinary tribunals are not bound by the rules of conduct but use them to fill in the standard in Section 46 of the Dutch Advocates Act (Advocatenwet); for security for an invoice, the core value at stake is integrity (Section 10a(1)(d)). Rule 19 imposes two requirements at once: a special case, and consultation with the Dean before the security is accepted. Notifying the Dean afterwards is not consultation. The Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal held a lawyer to account for a notarial acknowledgement of debt with a pledge that was reported to the Dean more than four months after execution (Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal 29 December 2025, paras 8.1 and 8.14). Consultation alone is not enough either: the lawyer still decides whether the case is special, and the tribunal reviews that decision (Arnhem-Leeuwarden Disciplinary Tribunal 2024, para. 5.4). Where the Dean had no objection to a mortgage in advance, a complaint about it came to nothing (Arnhem-Leeuwarden Disciplinary Tribunal 2021, paras 5.6-5.7).

A disciplinary case from The Hague shows how this works out in practice. In January 2019 a lawyer wrote to her clients that she would not represent them at the hearing unless they stood surety for the outstanding invoices. When the signed suretyships did not arrive, she announced that she would withdraw as their lawyer the next morning "before 10.00". The Disciplinary Tribunal called the suretyships impermissible and improper, held the considerable pressure she had applied against her and imposed a reprimand. That she later chose not to call on the suretyships did not excuse her (The Hague Disciplinary Tribunal 2022, paras 5.17 and 6.1-6.3). A cash deposit alongside an ordinary advance can also cross the line. An advance and a deposit of €65,340 each from a private client in a limited criminal case gave the lawyer an additional position of financial power. Without special circumstances and without contact with the Dean, that was improper (Amsterdam Disciplinary Tribunal 2026, paras 5.12-5.13).

Abuse of circumstances: why the security can be annulled

The civil court reads the rule of conduct together with Section 3:44(4) DCC. Abuse of circumstances requires that a person knows or should understand that another is being induced to perform a juridical act by special circumstances, such as dependence or inexperience, and nevertheless promotes that act although what he knows should have held him back. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal saw no reason to leave the rule of conduct out of that assessment. That only the disciplinary tribunal can impose a measure did not stand in the way (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2014, para. 3.7). A lawyer knows the rule or ought to know it, and that knowledge should have held him back from requiring the security, all the more so without pointing the client to the rule ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2012, para. 11.4.5).

According to the courts, the dependence follows largely from the relationship itself, given the client's interest in legal assistance. In the 2016 case there was also the company's financial distress and the timing just before the hearing ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2016, para. 4.6). In the 2012 case the firm also acted in the client's divorce, and he had no other lawyer when he signed ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2012, paras 11.4.1 and 11.4.6). In the 2014 case the lawyer threatened to withdraw shortly before a hearing. That the hearing would then have been postponed under the rules of procedure did not help the firm: a law firm could be expected to know that rule, and the client could not (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2014, para. 3.6).

That line has held since 2016. In 2019 the 's-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal annulled a mortgage, settlement agreements and deeds of pledge that partly secured a partnership of lawyers, for a debt for invoices whose existence had not been established. That the settlement agreements waived any reliance on annulment did not prevent this ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2019, paras 6.20-6.21). In 2023 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal upheld the annulment of a guarantee of €537,560.83 that a son had signed for his father's invoices. The lawyer was a friend of the family, knew that the son could not raise that amount without an expected distribution from an estate, and had not consulted the Dean (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2023, paras 3.9.3-3.9.4). The facts in both cases predate 2018, so the courts still applied Rule 28(1). Rule 19(1) is identical in substance.

What can a director-shareholder do about the suretyship?

A suretyship or guarantee that a lawyer requires without a special case and without prior consultation with the Dean breaches Rule 19(1). In the five court of appeal judgments on Section 3:44 DCC discussed here, such security was annulled every time. Even without a deed, the bar for the lawyer is high. An entrepreneur who promised to stand "personally as guarantor" did not thereby automatically become surety for all existing and future invoices of his company. The lawyer should have checked whether he understood that he was liable with his private assets. For a married director-shareholder, the spouse's consent is also required in principle (Section 1:88(1)(c) DCC). The exception for the ordinary course of business did not apply to a long-running, extensive litigation engagement, so the spouse could annul the suretyship (Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal 2024, paras 5.5 and 5.9-5.11).

An old suretyship can still be challenged. The three-year limitation period for a claim for annulment (Section 3:52(1)(b) DCC) plays no part if the director-shareholder invokes annulment to resist a claim based on the deed. That is possible at any time (Section 3:51(3) DCC). In the 2012 case the deed dated from 2004 and annulment was successfully invoked in 2011 ('s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 2012, paras 11.4.1-11.4.2). Anyone who claims annulment himself has three years from the moment the influence ceased. For the son's guarantee, that was at the earliest the day in November 2018 on which the distribution from the estate reached the law firm, more than seven years after the guarantee (Amsterdam Court of Appeal 2023, para. 3.9.5). When reliance on annulment counts as a defence, and when the limitation period still applies, is discussed in the post on a time-barred ground for annulment as a defence.

The defence must, however, be raised in the civil proceedings. A director who had bound herself personally, jointly and severally, in an engagement letter from 2015 allowed a default judgment to be given against her in the proceedings on the invoices. That judgment became final and later served as a supporting claim when her bankruptcy was petitioned. Her disciplinary complaint about the clause came too late. The ordinary complaint period is three years from the moment the complainant knew or could reasonably have known of the conduct (Section 46g(1)(a) of the Dutch Advocates Act). The tribunal also expressly left the validity of the claim to the civil court (Amsterdam Disciplinary Tribunal 2025, paras 5.8 and 5.16). Four questions matter immediately when a claim is brought under a suretyship or guarantee: was the Dean consulted in advance, what made the case special, under what pressure was it signed, and did the spouse consent. How the courts otherwise define the lawyer's duty of care is discussed under professional liability of lawyers.

Frequently asked questions

Which forms of security fall under Rule 19?

Anything that secures payment of the invoice and is not an advance in money. The explanatory notes to Rule 19 mention cars, thoroughbred horses, a mortgage from the client or from a third party, and the assignment of the client's receivables. The case law adds suretyships, joint and several liability, rights of pledge and a notarial acknowledgement of debt with a pledge. An ordinary advance in money remains permitted.

What if the director-shareholder proposed the guarantee himself?

That need not make a difference. In 2014 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal held that the lawyer should have held the director back, even insofar as he had proposed the guarantee himself, because it was not shown that he knew the rule of conduct. In the 2022 disciplinary case from The Hague, the clients had agreed to the suretyships, and the tribunal still held them against the lawyer.

What does a lawyer risk by requiring a suretyship anyway?

The Disciplinary Tribunals in The Hague, Arnhem-Leeuwarden and Amsterdam imposed reprimands, sometimes alongside other findings. In 2025 the Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal imposed a conditional four-week suspension from practice, partly because of inadequate information about costs. If annulment is successfully invoked, the security falls away and payments made under it must be repaid: in the 2012 case more than €11,900.

Cited case law

Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal: ECLI:NL:TAHVD:2025:272 (29 December 2025, paras 8.14-8.15; a notarial acknowledgement of debt with a right of pledge, without a special case and without prior consultation with the Dean, breaches Rule 19(1); notification afterwards is not consultation).

Courts of appeal: ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2016:4681 ('s-Hertogenbosch, 18 October 2016, paras 4.6-4.8; director-shareholder's suretyship annulled for abuse of circumstances, even if the lawyer's account is correct; invoking annulment as a defence is not time-barred); ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BW7211 ('s-Hertogenbosch, 29 May 2012, paras 11.4.3-11.4.8; a director's joint and several liability in exchange for release of the file annulled); ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2410 (Amsterdam, 3 June 2014, paras 3.6-3.9; the rule of conduct may be taken into account in applying Section 3:44 DCC, including for a guarantee proposed by the director); ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2019:517 ('s-Hertogenbosch, 12 February 2019, paras 6.20-6.22; mortgage, settlement agreements and deeds of pledge in favour of a partnership of lawyers annulled, contractual waiver of annulment disregarded); ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2023:959 (Amsterdam, 25 April 2023, paras 3.9.3-3.9.5; a son's guarantee for his father's invoices annulled; the period under Section 3:52(1)(b) DCC only starts when the influence ceases); ECLI:NL:GHARL:2024:6033 (Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 24 September 2024, paras 5.5-5.11; a promise to stand personally as guarantor is not a suretyship for all future invoices; the exception in Section 1:88(5) DCC does not apply to an extensive litigation engagement).

Disciplinary Tribunals: ECLI:NL:TADRSGR:2022:34 (The Hague, 14 March 2022, paras 5.17 and 6.1-6.3; suretyships extracted under threat of withdrawal before a hearing, reprimand); ECLI:NL:TADRARL:2024:18 (Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 8 January 2024, paras 5.4-5.10; even after consulting the Dean the lawyer decides himself whether the case is special, and that choice is reviewed; reprimand); ECLI:NL:TADRARL:2021:161 (Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 26 July 2021, paras 5.4-5.7; a mortgage with the Dean's prior consent is not culpable); ECLI:NL:TADRAMS:2025:215 (Amsterdam, 24 November 2025, paras 5.8 and 5.16; disciplinary complaint about a joint and several liability clause inadmissible after three years; the validity of the claim is for the civil court); ECLI:NL:TADRAMS:2026:107 (Amsterdam, 1 June 2026, paras 5.12-5.13; a cash deposit alongside an advance of the same amount creates an additional position of financial power and is improper without special circumstances and contact with the Dean).

See also